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Executive Summary 
 
1. The Welsh Assembly Government, along with spending authorities 
around the world, has chosen to provide public financial support for the 
arts. The principal purpose of this report is to provide a rationale for the 
amount of support appropriate for the Wales Millennium Centre.  
 
2. Despite clear guidance from HM Treasury as to the conditions under 
which public spending may be judged efficient, arts administrators in 
Britain persist in producing misleading ‘economic impacts of the arts’ 
studies to justify public subsidies. These studies fail to take into 
account displacement of other economic activity and do not consider 
alternative means of achieving economic development objectives, as 
they should if this were the true objective of arts subsidies.  In fact it is 
apparent that the purpose of arts subsidies is to encourage the arts 
and their appreciation, rather than economic development.    
 
3. There are a number of good reasons why art subsidies can be 
warranted. These include that appreciation of the arts is desirable in 
itself and generally encourages creativity and wellbeing, but requires 
experience. Many people are too impatient to invest in that experience 
and are worse off as a result. A subsidy to offset their inordinately high 
time preference and encourage cultivation of tastes for the arts can be 
justified.  
 
4. The high proportion of fixed costs in total costs for many arts 
organisations, and for the Wales Millennium Centre (WMC) in 
particular, may be a second reason for arts subsidies. The lack of 
opportunities for pricing so as to capture the full audience benefit, as 
measured by willingness to pay, can mean that arts activities that are 
warranted on cost grounds, are nonetheless unable to generate 
sufficient revenue to cover their costs without a subsidy.  
 
5. A third reason is that in countries conducting the experiment, the 
taxpaying electorate have shown themselves willing to subsidise arts 
facilities that individually they do not use. This is either so that they 
have the option of doing so or because they obtain some benefit from 
other people using the facilities.  Assuming a common human nature, 
and in the absence of similar experiments in this country, it is 
reasonable to assume the principle applies here as well. 
 
6. Few attempts have been made to assess the quantitative significance 
of these reasons. But decentralisation of arts funding administration 
and use of performance indicators measuring arts participation has 
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lead to a burgeoning of arts activity in recent years. This is consistent 
with the first rationale above for arts subsidies; public policy is 
concerned to widen arts appreciation.  It follows that, in the absence of 
more appropriate measures, a useful index is the subsidy per arts 
participant. The more appreciators of the arts from a given subsidy, the 
more effective is the subsidy, other things being equal (admittedly a 
huge qualification). These figures are difficult to calculate because 
audience or participant numbers are not always available from funding 
bodies. But taking a figure from the Arts Council of Wales report for 
2004/5 suggests an average subsidy of almost £8 a head in that year.  
Numbers from England in the late 1990s are considerably higher for 
music and opera.  Applying the £8 per head subsidy rate to WMC 
implies a payment of around £4.7 million in 2004/5, very substantially 
more than received at present. 
 
7. An illustrative application of travel distance as a means of assessing 
audience valuation of the WMC plausibly arrives at a larger maximum 
socially efficient subsidy, if necessary to cover fixed costs. Although the 
calculation is sensitive to participants’ full travel costs, the estimate 
used seems close to a lower bound, so that the maximum justifiable 
WMC subsidy presented in Appendix A is approaching the lower limit 
as well.  
 
8. Although the long run relationship between artistic activity and 
economic development is largely conjectural, there is some evidence 
that they are associated. Certainly the demand for the arts may be 
expected to rise with income. But at the city level perhaps too artistic 
activity attracts or retains types of people who are likely to create 
economic growth. Across a sample of British cities, there is a 
significant association between the density of theatres and affluence 
(Appendix B). Cardiff would not score well in this cultural comparison, 
were it not for the Wales Millennium Centre. As it is, there is no doubt 
that the Centre has become a symbol for what is innovative and 
attractive about Wales, so the current funding shortfall is extremely 
ironic. 
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Valuing the Wales Millennium Centre 
 
 
‘A country like Britain today survives and prospers by the talent and ability of its 
people. [Their] breadth of mind is enormously enhanced by interaction with art and culture.’ 
Tony Blair, Tate Modern speech 6 March 2007 
 
‘Praise the Lord! We are a musical nation’ Rev Eli Jenkins, Under Milk Wood Dylan Thomas 
 
 
What is the WMC worth to Wales – and the wider world? Policy makers need 
to know so as to establish what taxpayers and users should be willing to pay 
for it. The question cannot simply be answered by revenue generated, or 
revenue that could be earned, at the point of service. For WMC services are 
often not charged for – with good reason, as will be shown below. Yet viability 
of the Centre requires covering costs. This means that un-priced services 
must either be cross-subsidised by other, priced, services, or directly 
subsidised, if they are to continue. 
 
Allocation of state arts subsidies in the UK has been notorious until recently. 
The greater part was directed to London and they principally benefited affluent 
social groups, who were more likely to be art appreciators (Peacock 2000). 
Two recent developments have transformed this pattern. One is the 
decentralisation of fund distribution with devolution, instanced by the creation 
of the Arts Council for Wales. The other is a shift towards widening arts 
participation as a condition for payment of subsidies. The logic of this policy 
shift is broadly stated in the Prime Minister’s speech quoted above.  
 
To justify arts subsidies, a popular method of appraisal focuses on ‘jobs 
generated’. This report will show the approach is largely misconceived and in 
practice contrary to Treasury guidelines for public spending. Instead it is 
appropriate to consider policy makers’ objectives and the most efficient ways 
of attaining them. Arts subsidies are not intended to generate jobs or 
regenerate inner cities, nor is it likely that they are the most effective ways of 
achieving these two outcomes. A proper understanding of the aims of Arts 
policy helps an appreciation of both why a larger subsidy for the WMC policy 
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is warranted, in particular, and what constitutes an appropriate distribution of 
arts subsidies in general. 
 
 
1. Policy Objectives and Treasury Guidance 
 
H M Treasury provides guidance on ‘policy and programme development’ in 
‘the Green Book’. This document was prepared and revised in consultation 
with other government departments and with the devolved administrations. 
The guidance has also been adopted by the Welsh Assembly Government. 
The purpose of the Green Book is to ensure that no policy, programme or 
project is adopted without first having established whether there are better 
ways to achieve the policy objective/s and whether the resources required 
could be employed more efficiently elsewhere (H M Treasury 2003 Para 1.1). 
Elected policy makers establish policy objectives, but the means of achieving 
those objectives should be efficient so as to minimise the burden on the 
taxpayer. 
Policy makers subsidise the Arts primarily for educational reasons, in a very 
broad sense. There is some evidence of health and learning benefits from 
certain types of music, and art therapy has a long history (Rauscher et al 
1993; Hughes et al 1998). But governments finance education primarily 
because until a person has received education they are unlikely to know its 
true value, which is high. The same applies to (some) arts. This is why the 
Assembly’s policy statement, Creative Future: Cymru Greadigol (2002) 
espoused free entry to national museums and galleries, as well as improving 
access to cultural facilities and activities for audiences and participants. 
Moreover the memorandum of agreement between the Assembly and the 
WMC recognized both the WMC’s role in improving access and the 
willingness of the Assembly to subsidise the process. 
The arts may serve a number of purposes, including achieving another 
Assembly objective in the Creative Future document;  
‘using Wales’ distinct culture and its achievements to raise its international 
profile’.  
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As the home of the (touring) Welsh National Opera, the WMC contributes to 
this goal. In addition, by putting on self-financing performances that attract 
visitors from outside Wales as well as favourable international media 
coverage, WMC enhances Wales’ image in the wider world ( for ‘we are a 
musical nation’). 
2. The Current Practice of Economic Impact Appraisal of the Arts 
Despite these objectives, it is common for lobbyists for arts subsidies to focus 
on the ‘economic impacts’ of the arts (Myerscough 1988; Bryan et al 20001; 
Reeves 2002; Shellard 20042). These impacts are typically boosted principally 
by multiplier analysis3. Indeed the process has become so routine in the 
United States that it is possible to visit the ‘Americans for the Arts’ website, 
and type into an ‘Arts and Economic Prosperity Calculator’ the population of a 
community, the arts spend and the numbers of the audiences. The calculator 
will then create figures for FTE jobs generated, as well as the boost to 
household income and state and local tax revenues. These will allow the 
visitor to ‘make the case for arts support in your community’.  Alternatively for 
the same purpose, the lobbyist may cull extracts from the 170 page document 
on the same site extolling the GDP-enhancing impact of the arts (Americans 
for the Arts 2003). 
 
Turning to one of the most recent British exercises, Shellard’s (2004) theatre 
study defines economic impact as 
‘the total economic activity generated by a theatre (in other words, what economic 
activity an area would lose in total if the theatre was not there)’.  
Rather extraordinarily, the preferred formula for estimating this impact 
engages in double counting. Not only is theatre expenditure on wages and 
                                                 
1 Note that Bryan et al (2000) discreetly comment that their analysis does not take into 
account (the critical) supply side effects. 
2 ‘….the arts sector has recognised the value of being able to quantify its economic impact 
for, among other things, the justification for continued public funding.’ (Shellard 2004). 
3 ‘Multipliers are used in impact studies to take into account the knock-on effect of spending 
by the theatre throughout the local economy. To ensure that this study produces a viable but 
cautious result, a multiplier of 1.5 has been used..’ (Shellard 2004). Analysis of the economic 
impact of the Brecon Jazz Festival in 2000 yielded a similar multiplier value for output but 
from an input-output model. An important caveat, considering that the Festival is run by 
volunteers, as the authors observed, is that their estimates are gross of displacement effects- 
see below (Jones and Munday 2004). 
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salaries and goods and services included as well as additional visitor 
spending in the locality, but also, ideally the reader is told, theatre turnover 
(formula 2). Yet, as terms are conventionally defined, the turnover of a 
business consists of receipts which are then spent on the items listed above. 
Fortunately the less preferred formula 1, used in practice, does not double 
count in this manner. But nor does it take into account critical elements of 
appraisal, prescribed in the Treasury manual, which would vitally affect the 
overall assessment. 
 
When correctly undertaken, a full impact analysis must address non-
additionality and displacement (which reduce impact) as well as linkage and 
multiplier effects (which may increase impact). 
 
An outcome is non-additional when targeted behaviour is unchanged by the 
policy. An instance would be when an arts subsidy assists an organisation to 
do something which they would have done anyway. Displacement arises 
when support for an arts supplier boosts its activity, but at the cost of reduced 
activity elsewhere. Displacement cannot be assessed by asking subsidy 
benificiaries  themselves.   
 
There is a linkage effect when arts organisations increase their activity, and 
consequently their purchases, some of which may be supplied by local firms 
(Such a consequence is sometimes called an input–output multiplier or inter-
industry multiplier effect).  Using local or regional input-output tables, the 
value of supplies which correspond to £1 extra of added value can be 
estimated.  The strength of the linkage effect depends on purchases per 
pound of added value, and on the proportion of local sourcing.  Hence, an arts 
organisation which buys a great deal per pound of added value, much of 
which can be sourced locally, will have a strong linkage effect. But when local 
businesses are already operating close to full capacity the extra demand will 
simply displace other customers. For instance additional visitor spending is 
the second largest component of expenditure in Shellard’s table 1. It consists 
of expenditure on transport, food and drink, and childcare, incurred by 
audience members as a result of a visit to the theatre. In London it is 
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reasonably clear that such extra spending is more likely to drive up prices, to 
ration out the scarce restaurant, transport and child care resources, than to 
increase their supply. Elsewhere it is probable that, without a theatre, 
restaurant spending for example, would take place in another location, but 
would not necessarily diminish in total. 
 
The multiplier effect arises when unemployed people find work and so acquire 
higher disposable incomes. The rise in spending then supports extra 
economic activity, part of which will be in the local economy, mainly in the 
service sector.  The extent of the expenditure increase will depend on 
conditions prior to gaining a job and on earnings afterwards.  To estimate the 
proportion of this increase that will be spent locally, allowance must be made 
for imports to the area, for taxes and for savings.  With appropriate corrections 
for these deductions, local impacts are likely to be small, as well as smaller 
the more circumscribed the area. 
. 
A theatre subsidy may create a demand for more cleaning and maintenance 
that ‘creates jobs’ in one sense. If these jobs were genuinely ‘additional’ there 
would be other multiplier ‘rounds’, as new employment created further 
demand for labour, such as in retailing to serve the greater demand of the 
newly employed. But in practice the total number of jobs may not be 
increased, instead employment may merely be diverted, with miniscule 
upward pressure on wages. In this case there are no employment multiplier 
effects. Another possibility is that the jobs are filled by commuters or by 
migrants to the region – as for example the inflow of EU accession state 
workers to Wales.  Then if the spending that brought them in was additional, 
the region would be economically bigger. But if the spending was not, the 
regional economy is only larger when the outlays support more employment in 
its new use. Traditionally actors have been subject to higher unemployment 
rates of any group, and wages of arts workers have been low (as Reeves 
2002 acknowledges). These are not the properties of employment that appeal 
to advocates of local economic development. And then there is a policy 
question about the desired trade-off between more, and higher paid, jobs. 
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Local or regional supply might expand as demand increases when there are 
large numbers of people available to work but unable to find jobs. However 
registered unemployment in Wales is now low (equal to, or lower than, the UK 
average) - and employment has been increasing. Also low by comparison with 
the UK average is labour force participation, partly because of high numbers 
of invalidity benefit claimants. Increased demand for labour- from subsidised 
arts or other organisations - are unlikely to affect these totals. There will be no 
multiplier effect because of displacement. Indeed an eminent economist of the 
arts has expressed his concern that the current practice of economic impact 
studies was capable of demonstrating the economic development advantages 
of an earthquake (Blaug 2001). By completely neglecting the supply side of 
the economy (such as the destruction caused by an earthquake) and 
measuring only spending, (in the earthquake case on reconstruction) the 
economic impact of an earthquake that induced the expenditure would look 
most beneficial.  
 
This is not to deny that cultural activities have an impact on the economy (for 
a survey see OECD 2005 and a critical summary Seaman 2003). It is simply 
that the principle effect in the short run of larger cultural industries is likely to 
be a change in the composition, rather than in the level, of economic activity. 
A qualification to this conclusion would be if the cultural activity were timed to 
improve capacity utilization - for example by increasing the demand for off-
season hotel accommodation. It also true that ‘cultural tourism’ (along with 
ordinary tourism) constitutes an export for a locality that in principle supports 
more non-tradeable service industry such as retailing. This is the supply side 
analogy to the demand multiplier, and also requires resources if there is to be 
an effect net of displacement. When existing export industries are declining, 
such tourism might fill the gap. Or increased labour force participation could 
allow a growing export industry and therefore higher incomes. But in practice 
these qualifications are unlikely to affect the conclusion that more artistic 
activity may affect the quality of life but in the short run the net economic 
impact on the level of incomes and employment activity will be minimal. 
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In Wales a Vibrant Economy, the Assembly government set out objectives, to 
increase employment still further, and to raise the quality of jobs. But it did not 
propose to achieve these objectives with arts subsidies. This is entirely 
appropriate because there is no reason to expect that arts subsidies are the 
best way directly to attain these goals. ‘Economic impact of the arts’ studies 
never compare the costs of alternative ways of achieving supposed 
employment and income effects, for obvious reasons. Yet this justification for 
arts subsidies requires such a comparison, according to Treasury guidance.  
 
More sensibly, when government wants to subsidise arts, they do so for 
reasons other than stimulating the local economy. So the focus should be on 
the cogent and relevant reasons that warrant arts subsidies in general and 
subsidies to WMC in particular. 
 
3.  Market Failure 
A core concept in the Treasury manual, that may provide a justification for 
government intervention such as an arts subsidy, is ‘market failure’. This 
occurs when the market under- or over- supplies a service or good (such as 
performing arts). The optimum is defined in terms of what individuals and 
families would choose, given their incomes, and the costs of production, if 
‘imperfections’ were not present. The underlying principle is that a person’s 
choices in markets reflect what they value.  
 
How much they can afford to pay depends upon their income and 
circumstances but progressive taxes and a redistributive welfare system are 
for appraisal purposes generally assumed to address adequately the pre-tax 
and benefit income distribution. When public sector projects pursue equity 
objectives, the measures of wellbeing should be adjusted with weights that 
increase the lower is personal or family income. In practice, for arts subsidies, 
this may mean a simpler but often less accurate solution of especially 
targeting low income groups. 
 
What people might pay for a service is critically important in this scheme, and 
this is not identical with prices or total spending. The missing component is 
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that a person who buys a ticket for a concert may have been willing if 
necessary to pay more than actually charged. The difference between the 
maximum they would have been willing to pay, reflecting their valuation of the 
concert, and what they actual pay, is this person’s consumer surplus. Or put 
another way, willingness to pay equals actual payment plus consumer’s 
surplus. These ideas can be central to an intellectually sound basis for arts 
subsidies in particular cases.  
 
Willingness to pay is a measure of social value, when public resources are to 
be committed. It can be estimated either from behaviour (‘revealed 
preference’), or from what is said (‘stated preference’). 
 
4. Learning and the formation of tastes 
Economics and Treasury appraisal has difficulty with arts policy because of 
their (above) normative assumption of consumer sovereignty. If most people 
do not value the arts sufficiently to pay their costs why should democratic 
government impose taxes to subsidise minority tastes? As already indicated, 
the source of market failure that justifies a subsidy is related to education and 
learning. The arts are not unique in being a cultivated taste; babies are not 
born with a taste for tea, it is acquired by familiarity. Childhood experience of 
the arts increases adult demand (McCain 2003). The cultivation of tastes 
implies that preferences are transformed by the experience.  But then why do 
adults not choose to cultivate a sufficient taste for the arts, if they can manage 
to do so for, say, spectator sport?  
 
 One answer is that the majority of the population is not exposed to the 
experience of arts, as against the experience of spectator sport (simply as 
measured by media time and space for instance). When people do have 
certain ‘cultural experiences’ their valuations of it are subsequently higher. 
Getzner and Oberlercher (2003) used a visitors' survey to value the museum 
experience measured by visitors' willingness to pay an admission fee (in 
Austria). While visitors actually paid 1.1 euros on average for the admission 
fee, after having seen the exhibition, they would have been willing to pay up to 
7.8 euros. Econometric estimation shows that willingness to pay (WTP) is 
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strongly correlated with the respondent's income, the perception of the quality 
of the museum and the admission fee already paid.  This implies that there 
would be more visitors, if experience was wider. 
 
Another response is that a longer investment in taste cultivation for the arts is 
necessary than to appreciate, say, a cup of tea. Then impatience, coupled 
with a considered public opinion that impatience is undesirable, is a form of 
failure that might warrant state intervention. The rate at which present benefits 
are preferred to future benefits is a quantitative measure of impatience. If this 
rate is high then individuals may chose not to invest now in experiences 
(especially performing arts) that will make them better off in the future. Instead 
they will prefer instant gratification, such as may be had out of a bottle, 
perhaps helped by advertising.  
 
What evidence is there for impatience? First of all some discounting of the 
future might be thought entirely reasonable; we may not be here tomorrow, 
technology may solve this generation’s problems in the next generation and 
anyway investment opportunities mean money this year can be converted into 
more next year4.  But questionnaire evidence suggests personal time discount 
rates of young people are much higher than these considerations warrant. A 
sample of Cardiff young people (mean age 22.6 years SD 5.37) showed on 
average a time preference of more than 15 percent a month5. This makes 
credit card rates appear good value by comparison, and explains why young 
people are liable to accumulate large credit card debts. Public policy to offset 
this high time preference could be warranted for some experience goods, 
(such as some performing arts).  
 
Another condition for intervention is that there must be a judgment that the 
arts are a taste worth acquiring. The Assembly has made such a judgment, in 
common with spending authorities throughout the world. 
 
                                                 
4  The public sector discount rate of the Treasury Green Book is 3.5 percent per annum. 
5 68 respondents were asked ‘what would you sell £120 in 30 days for now’ and ‘what would you pay 
for £120 in 30 days’ . The mean responses were respectively £102.9 (sd 28.9) and £76.7 (sd 34.9).   
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5. Pricing and Cost Recovery  
The high proportion of fixed to variable costs for the performing arts in 
general, and for the WMC in particular (7:3), can mean that socially valuable 
activities (as measured by the excess of individuals’ willingness to pay over 
costs) might nonetheless not be viable in the market (discussed further in 
Appendix A). A pricing policy that captures sufficient revenue could be 
impossible to achieve - even though a theoretically perfect pricing scheme 
would provide enough to recover costs. There could be a market failure. 
Suppliers of electricity and gas, who also have high fixed relative to variable 
costs, address the problem with a rental charge (to cover the fixed costs) and 
a separate per unit price (to cover the variable costs), often graduated 
according to volume consumed. In the performing arts, the nearest 
approximation to this approach is with season tickets or special arrangements 
for paying ‘Friends’ of the organization. But the heterogeneity of the arts and 
preferences for them renders this a far less complete solution.  
 
This is especially so for the WMC casual visitors and the foyer performances, 
a critical element of WMC strategy to widen the experience of the arts. These 
visits can only take place if the fixed costs of WMC are covered. One 
theoretical pricing solution is to recover fixed costs by marking up prices on 
marginal costs, and according to the price-responsiveness of demands for 
particular services - so for highly responsive demands the markup would be 
low6. The casual visitor programme is deliberately not priced to avoid 
deterring visitors, who anyway incur travel costs, (high price responsiveness). 
Moreover the short-run marginal cost of a casual visitor is close to zero. A 
proportionate markup on zero yields a zero price.  So the only way the casual 
visitor programme could be financed, without a subsidy, would be by 
somehow loading all the fixed costs on to the ticketed performances.  That is, 
one group of arts audience would be paying to subsidise another group’s 
participation. This would be inconsistent with Assembly policy to widen 
participation in the Arts, for some ticket buyers would be deterred by the 
higher prices. 
                                                 
6 This is the principle of Ramsey pricing, which maximises well-being subject to a minimum profit 
constraint (and in the case considered above, where the demands are independent). 
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 The problem of covering fixed costs is exacerbated for the WMC by the 
position of the resident companies and the WNO. These impose fixed costs 
but the revenue contributions are less than proportionate to the space they 
utilise. 
 
The fixed cost recovery problem above applies to rugby matches and sports 
stadia as much as to arts performances and the WMC. The difference is that 
the greater interest in spectator sport – coupled with sale of television rights - 
means much higher chances of covering fixed costs by feasible market 
pricing. Logically the question of whether there is a market or other failure that 
warrants a subsidy devolves to whether the relatively low willingness to pay 
for art compared with, for example, spectator sport, reflects a failure. The 
suggestion of the previous section was that the sources of failure are not in 
the market but in experience and individuals’ time preference rates.  
 
There is nonetheless a strong demand for the WMC that does not translate 
into WMC revenue, as signalled by the distance travelled to visit. Those who 
travel a longer distance generally incur higher costs to attend a performance. 
These time and money costs can substantially exceed the price of a ticket. 
The demand for the performance or facility can be calculated as a visitor rate 
from a given location, which depends upon the distance of that location and 
individual characteristics, in particular income, education and age. In 
Appendix A an estimate is presented of the value of the WMC implied by 
some of the audience travel evidence of Table 1.  The Appendix shows that, 
at a conservative reckoning, this demand data indicates a subsidy of up to 
£6.75 million could be justified to help WMC cover its fixed costs. 
 
Without utilising the individual level data necessary to estimate a travel cost 
demand function, it can be demonstrated that the demand for WMC’s 
performance of the Ring Cycle was strong (ticket prices would show the 
same). For the largest single group came from Greater London rather than 
Cardiff, say 150 miles or 240 kilometres. 
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For total WMC visitors in 2006 their proportion of the regional population is 
given in table 1 below, (assuming each only visited once and that the rest of 
the world was just the UK). Considering almost half the population of Wales 
lives in the South East it is notable that (on the above assumption) the 
proportion visiting WMC is so high. From table 1 it is obvious that the chances 
of visiting decline with distance. But the fact that from the South West there is 
a ten percent probability of a visit is striking, considering Swansea is 40 miles 
from Cardiff and Pembroke 100 miles7.  
 
Socio-economic characteristics of the audience shows the extent to which 
WMC serves an audience of 'moderate means' and 'hard pressed' – 22 
percent of the total. This falls to 13 percent for WNO audiences. As expected 
in view of travel costs, these groups are more likely to come from SE Wales 
than the more affluent categories. 
 
The explanation for the widespread and unusual socioeconomic mix of visitors 
is partly the pull of the casual visitor programme.  Half were going to visit, or 
had visited, somewhere else in the Bay area. 28 percent of visitors were 
unaware of the Donald Gordon Theatre, the core of the WMC. This reflects 
both the number of visitors with minimal understanding of WMC and what it 
did, and those who saw the Centre as a visitor attraction, rather than as an 
arts centre. 
 
Table 1 Proportion of Regional Population  
Visiting the Wales Millenium Centre in 2006 
SE Wales      0.339  
SW Wales      0.101  
Mid-Wales      0.058  
North 
 Wales      0.009  
Outside      0.001  
                                                 
7 79 percent of casual visitors to WMC were from Wales, with 19 percent travelling from other 
parts of the UK. 1.5 percent of respondents were international visitors. Of those Welsh 
visitors, the vast majority lived reasonably locally, with just 4 percent coming from Mid or 
North Wales. This is reinforced by the travel times cited by respondents. 82 percent of visitors 
travelled for an hour or less. 
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 Casual visitors are not looking for the same exposure as say a ticket buyer, 
yet the foyer performances, averaging two a day, mean that there is a high 
chance  that they will experience a concert or other performance in the course 
of their visit. The logic of arts policy is that non-participants should be 
encouraged to learn the value of arts. Then non-ticket buyers are precisely 
the type which needs to be enticed in to the arts, and therefore warrant 
subsidy. Ticket buyers are more probably already committed. The initial 
(travel cost) valuations of casual visitors are likely to be lower than those of 
ticket buyers but their experience at the WMC is likely to raise their valuation 
in retrospect, as survey evidence suggests. 99 percent of respondents said 
that they would return to WMC. 36 percent of those who visited WMC 
between April 2005 and April 2006 were doing so for the first time. 12 percent 
had been over ten times.  WMC attracted consistently high levels of first time 
visitors and did not rely on repeat visits. On the whole, casual visitors to WMC 
were already arts attenders. 90 percent had experienced a theatre event in 
their lifetime and 83 percent had attended a music event. However, two  
percent had never been to arts event or museum before in their lifetime. 
 
6. Option Demands 
A third market failure idea that underwrites the justification for arts subsidies, 
and that can be quantified is that people want some art facilities to be 
available even if they themselves do not intend to use them at present- they 
have an ‘option demand’. Perhaps also there is a belief in an ‘external 
benefit’; that those utilising the arts facilities confers a benefit upon others, 
worth paying for. In both cases it not usually possible to price the service in 
the market by conventional means, so that the pay-off is reflected in the 
revenue.  
 
There are a number of ways to elicit how much these pay-offs are worth8. 
With the appropriate constitutional arrangements, plausible valuations over 
and above market prices can be established. Switzerland’s use of referenda 
                                                 
8 The OECD (2005 pp52-56) discusses some of the challenges of estimating them accurately. 
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provides a convincing example that people are prepared to vote for specific 
art subsidies of a particular size, knowing that it has tax or other spending 
implications for themselves. A well-documented instance is the 1973 and 
1974 proposals to increase the public subsidy to the municipal theatre in 
Basle. Econometric analysis showed that the lower the expected increase in 
the tax burden (and therefore increase in the subsidy) the higher the 
proportion that would vote ‘yes’. The model very accurately predicted the 
proportion voting ‘yes’ in the second referendum that was actually passed – 
with a reduced subsidy compared with that proposed in 1973 (Frey and 
Pommerehne 1989).  
 
It is unnecessary to embrace Swiss constitutional procedures to acknowledge 
a potential public willingness to pay other than at the point of service. But an 
accurate assessment of the size of the option demand-warranted subsidy in 
Wales would require some investment in procedures for eliciting the 
information. 
 
7. The Political Economy of  Subsidies 
The discussion so far has been about why arts subsidies might be justified in 
the context of Treasury guidelines. Various forms of market and other failures 
have been considered. The fact that the arts require experience of them for 
their appreciation renders them similar to education. So similar considerations 
warrant state subsidies for arts as for education. The observation that many 
people are extremely impatient and therefore will not invest in worthwhile 
experiences provides another reason to subsidise arts, as an offset; this is the 
justification for free admission to museums and galleries and for the foyer 
programme of the WMC.  
 
Whether or not the recovery of fixed costs when these constitute a high 
proportion of the total constitutes a market failure, it is a major problem for an 
industry that has little scope for multipart pricing. The root of the difficulties is 
still the weakness of demand stemming from the learning necessary to enjoy 
the arts, but the fixed costs exacerbate the management challenges.  
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Evidence that individuals are willing to pay either or both for the option and for 
others to enjoy the arts, creates another possibility of market failure; that is, 
for revenues that can be earned at the point of sale to be less than would be 
earned with an ideal charging system. Hence option demand and external 
benefit offer another possible reason for subsidies. If these principles were 
accepted, the size and distribution of subsidies between suppliers to achieve 
Assembly objectives should reflect extent of market failure, including the level 
of the activity. One possible approach is to assume this is so and infer the 
extent of market failures from the distribution of subsidies. This has the merit 
of avoiding the extreme difficulty of measuring the market failures, which has 
not yet been undertaken. On the other hand it does not permit an evaluation 
of current practice. Such an evaluation is desirable because the same 
principles that underpin Treasury guidance predict that in practice subsidies 
may be determined and distributed in an altogether different fashion. 
 
Politicians and administrators who make decisions about the size and 
distribution of subsidies are lobbied by pressure groups, with specialized 
information. Consequently they may be inclined to favour those who are better 
organized for this purpose, concentrating funds on a few, large, well- 
established suppliers (Frey 2003). The more money at stake, the more it is 
worth investing in lobbying. On the other hand concessions for the large 
components of expenditure are more expensive than for the small.  
 
The arts are small beer in the total of government spending on education, 
health and even economic development. For the Welsh Assembly 
Government, culture, Welsh language and sport accounted for about one 
percent of expenditure. The size and distribution of subsidies between 
suppliers to achieve Assembly objectives must be influenced by the costs of 
arts organisations. These costs may not be independent of the funding; their 
general performance could be influenced by the financial arrangements. Free 
access to museums and galleries may have the drawback of relieving 
pressure on these organisations to satisfy the general public by competing for 
their custom, unless visitor numbers becomes a performance indicator which 
carries revenue consequences. But if there is no possibility of the facility 
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closing, then management must be accountable for performance and 
measures of performance must be agreed- as for UK government 
departments in their public service agreements.  This incentive is desirable for 
the supplier because the funder ‘principal’ is likely to know less than the arts 
supplier ‘agent’ about the costs and possibilities available. It does provide a 
reason for the art supplier agent to find about the options and their costs, 
which an unconditional cheque does not. 
 
There is no guarantee that an increase in subsidy will elicit a minimum cost 
increase in services. Of course, any such suggestion of anything else would 
always be strongly denied by the subsidised organisation. The converse 
proposals to limit costs will normally be met by claims that any reduction in 
subsidy will lower the quality of output. 
 
The funder then faces a dilemma. Should they reward success, increase the 
subsidy of organisations successful at generating revenue, or penalize it? 
Should they instead reward (and thereby encourage) failure to generate 
revenue, on the grounds that the public needs the service? There is evidence 
from a panel of UK museums funded by central government, that increases in 
non-grant income reduce future government subsidies (Maddison 2004). 
Whether these reductions are sufficient to offset entirely the financial benefits 
from charging or the pursuit of private benefactors, is unfortunately unclear. 
Changes in visitor numbers do not appear to cause changes in government 
grants, despite the policy objective of widening access to museums. The 
management incentive is clear on widening access; do not be concerned with 
visitors. Where revenue is concerned, in this instance the jury is still out on 
the incentive from the implicit tax rate stemming from subsidy withdrawal.   
 
The WMC has been extremely successful in obtaining funding from ticket 
sales and for fixed costs from a wide variety of other sources, including 
sponsorship, to finance a very wide programme of activities that has achieved 
international acclaim. Comparison with other organisations indicates low costs 
of delivery. Yet as a result of an imprecise and inadequate initial financial 
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agreement with the Welsh Assembly, there is now no chance of the budget 
being balanced. 
 
Given the objective of widening access to the arts, one measure of the 
effectiveness of subsidies is the subsidy cost per visitor or participant. 
Estimated grant per visitor shows British Library a very expensive outlier in 
2001-2 (£159.6) compared with national museums, the National Gallery and 
English Heritage- but then the nature of the activities are different (books and 
documents consulted) (Peacock 2000). Subsidies to music per client (£19.1) 
in 1997/8 were higher than to drama (£7.5). Probably greater support was 
provided for national companies than local, as is apparent for WNO relative to 
other Welsh companies.  
 
In 2004/5 the Arts Council Wales (ACW) received about £23.8 million in grant 
from the Welsh Assembly and spent about £4.4 million on administering its 
awards (from the Lottery as well) (Arts Council of Wales 2005). The Council 
states that through subsidized organizations this subsidy has allowed access 
to the arts for (more than) 3.5 million people.  On top of the WAG income in 
2004/5 ACW spent £13.5 million from Lottery money, with a total expenditure 
net of operating costs of £36.7 million. Capital expenditure offers amounted to 
£8.9m. So revenue programme expenditure was £27.8 million. Divided by 3.5 
million arts attendees, this averages almost £8 per head9.  
 
At this rate WMC’s 255,000 uncharged visitors would warrant a £2 million 
subsidy. But many of the ticketed performances could not be expected to 
cover their costs by charging, if the wider access agenda is to be pursued. If 
these performances were subsidized at the same rate, their subsidy would be 
                                                 
9 Compare with this the Arts Council for England music subsidy per capita 1997-8 of £19.1, 
for dance, £25.9 and for drama, £7.5. The British Museum subsidy was forecasted at £6.5 per 
visitor 2001/2 (Peacock 2000). The value of money has of course declined in the ensuing 
years, so that after 9 years, with 2.5 percent inflation a year, an extra 25 percent subsidy 
would be needed to buy in 2007 what could have been bought in 1998. In this context, a 
subsidy of £8 per participant by 2007 looks good value. 
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another £2.7 million, a total of £4.7 million, for 2004/5, considerably less than 
the WMC actually received10. 
 
8. Economic Development and the Arts in the Long Term 
Section 2 demonstrated the conditions that must be satisfied for most 
economic impacts of the arts studies to show the true economic effects are 
unlikely to be fulfilled. The mere fact that the arts employ people, and thereby 
constitute an industry, does not in itself boost economic development or 
warrant a subsidy.   
 
In the long term prosperity has traditionally brought an increasing demand for 
the performing arts and other cultural pursuits. Cities, such as Cardiff, based 
on newer economies in the march of British history, may be less well 
endowed with cultural facilities, because eighteenth and nineteenth century 
wealthy private benefactors were far less abundant. Unless their local 
economies have proved buoyant throughout the twentieth century, this can 
then create a gap in the twenty first century between older and newer cities, to 
the detriment of artistic and cultural life in the newer.  
    
Such a gap matters in its own right, but does it influence subsequent 
economic development? Do regions or cities with a richer range of cultural 
facilities grow faster, attract more people both possessing highly marketable 
skills and being more entrepreneurial? Quantitative research along these 
lines, largely stimulated by Richard Florida’s Rise of the Creative Class, is still 
in its infancy. An entire number of Local Economy (2004, 4 ) was devoted to 
cultural policy and urban regeneration. Some research has shown that 
diversity in US cities appears to boost productivity of US Citizens (Ottaviano 
and Peri 2006). But that is some way from the ‘artistic spinoffs’ element of the 
Florida thesis. This facet has been vigorously contested on the reasonable 
grounds that artists are different sorts of people from say computer 
                                                 
10 Arts subsidies nominally earmarked ‘Wales Millennium Centre’ are not paid to the WMC 
management in entirety as a revenue subsidy. The Assembly £2 million with this heading is 
distributed £0.75 million  as revenue to the Centre as such, £0.45 million as a sinking fund for 
the capital costs of the building and the remainder as revenue subsidies for six of the seven 
(independent) resident organizations, including the Welsh National Opera. Urdd Gobaith 
Cymru, as the seventh resident, receives no revenue subsidy from this earmarked £2 million. 
 
  20
 
 
 
programmers, with different incomes (Markusen 2006). Yet the idea that 
footloose entrepreneurs and firms will locate where the facilities provide the 
life style that decision makers and highly skilled workers enjoy, is entirely 
plausible. 
 
Unfortunately the data to test and quantify such an effect is not readily 
available. The cross-European Urban Audit project  
(http://www.urbanaudit.org/) yields some data but not yet on a consistent 
basis across Europe, and with massive gaps simply as far as the British 
sample (that includes Cardiff) is concerned (see Appendix B for tables and 
analysis).  
 
The few cultural facts available, such as theatres, libraries, museums (left 
blank for Cardiff) are suggestive that older cities are better endowed with this 
type of cultural capital, so that they are now often associated with declining 
populations. But even declining populations can be an artefact of city 
boundaries, and shifts towards lower density living. Bristol is recorded as 
having experienced a falling population, to a level of 380.6 thousand, 
compared with Cardiff’s 305.3 thousand and increasing population. As 
expected Bristol rents exceed those of Cardiff.  
 
On theatres and museums Cardiff compares very unfavourably with Bristol, 
possibly partly because of different geographies of conurbations. But Cardiff 
also looks culturally poor in comparison with the much smaller Cambridge and 
with Scotland’s capital. In fact Cardiff is close to the sample average in 
population size- perhaps reflecting inappropriate urban boundaries-  slightly 
above in rents, library borrowing per head and percentage of finance and 
business service employment, and substantially below in numbers of theatres, 
libraries and (assuming Cardiff has three) museums (see Appendix B table). 
 
Cities with higher rents are presumably more prosperous because higher 
earners (or inheritors) bid up the price of housing. British cities in the sample 
with more theatres per head of population are more likely to have higher 
rents, consistent with ‘culture’ creating prosperity. But no less plausible is the 
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reverse explanation; that better off cities will demand more theatre 
performances.. When the proportion of the workforce in finance and business 
services is included in the regression model (Appendix B), the theatres 
variable is still statistically significantly different from zero. The coefficient 
implies that one more theatre per 100,000 of population is associated with 
rents that are 10 percent higher than the sample average. So these results 
are consistent with more performing arts, either or both of, causing or being 
an effect of greater prosperity at the city level in Britain, as the Florida thesis 
maintains. On the other hand it is possible that changing the city sample and 
definition will change the results. 
 
A rich artistic city life may, in commercial parlance promote a city’s ‘brand 
image’. WMC’s striking architecture has already proved its worth in a variety 
of advertising media, from tourism through to politics. But what is general 
‘image’ worth? It is pertinent that UKTI, Britain’s official organisation for 
promoting trade and investment, has been collecting material on what aspects 
of their promotional activity are effective. Case study evidence indicates that 
UK image (‘Cool Britannia’) is not generally helpful - and sometimes 
counterproductive - for winning contracts for individual businesses. Less 
general and abstract notions typically sway business decisions. 
 
WMC is fine for promoting cultural tourism, but probably not more generally. 
Yet, as already discussed, an export justification for an arts subsidy is highly 
questionable. If the policy objective is to promote exports earnings, the arts 
have not been demonstrated the most effective way of doing it. The point of 
the arts is not economic, a means to an end; they are an end in themselves. 
Arts policy is primarily concerned to ensure the end is more widely shared, not 
to encourage economic development, even though this may be a spin-off.   
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Appendix A. Willingness to Pay, Consumers’ Surplus and Subsidies for 
the Performing Arts 
 
In section 5 the possibility is discussed that high fixed costs could render a 
performing arts enterprise unviable even when it was socially desirable; that 
is, when the willingness to pay for performances exceeds the costs.  Figure 1 
demonstrates this possibility. The horizontal axis measures number of 
performances and the vertical axis, money values. The downward sloping line 
nearest the vertical axis is the demand curve, the price all are prepared to pay 
for a given number of performances. The other curve is the average cost of a 
performance which falls as  more are undertaken, because of the fixed costs.  
The average cost of a performance when the number of performances is N, is 
B. The maximum single price the audience is willing to pay for each of N 
performances is A.  But the consumers’ surplus is the triangle ADC which is 
greater than the subsidy necessary to finance N performances, the rectangle 
ABxN. That is, if the enterprise could charge for each performance the 
maximum willingness to pay, the revenue would substantially exceed the 
costs. The demand curve is below the average cost curve for all levels of 
concert, opera or theatre performance.(willingness to pay for an extra 
performance is less than the average cost of that extra performance). But the 
total satisfaction that audiences obtain includes the maximum each would be 
willing to pay for each performance, the area OCDN, And this exceeds costs 
OBEN.. 
 
Figure A1 
 
 
Forrest Grime and Woods (2000) adapt this idea to justifying a subsidy for the 
Manchester Royal Exchange Theatre’s performance of the Brothers 
Karamazov in February 1993. They estimated the parameters of a demand 
function in which the price was the distance traveled to get to the 
performance. They then calculated the consumers’ surplus for each zone or 
N
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location, in distance units. At the sample mean a distance of 2.66 km was 
equivalent to a £1 increase in ticket price. The largest apparent consumers’ 
surplus was in the zone at a mean distance of 19 kms. Their best estimate of 
total consumers’ surplus indicated that the social return to a subsidy of £1.5 
million was one third greater than the outlay.  
 
The principle of estimating how consumers’ surplus varies with distance can 
be demonstrated as follows. Assume that in two adjacent ‘travel to WMC’ 
zones (ordered by distance from WMC) the valuation distributions of those 
interested in visiting in the two zones are the same. Then ordering these 
valuations from highest to lowest willingness to pay, constructs the demand 
curve D’D’’ in figure A2. Numbers visiting fall from N1 to N2 as travel costs 
rise between zone 1 and the more distant zone 2. 
 
Figure A2 
 
N1 N2 
Zone1 travel 
costs + ticket Z1’
Zone 2  costs 
Z2’ 
D’ 
Z2’’ 
Z1’’ 
D’’ 
Visitors 
£ 
 
  26
 
 
 
Assuming further that D’D’’ is linear as drawn, the fall off in numbers in 
response to the rise in costs (using for example official travel cost data) allows 
the calculation of the vertical distance Z1’D’, and therefore of the consumers’ 
surplus triangle D’Z1’Z1’’. The area of the triangle is calculated as 
0.5[Z1’N1xN1 x (Z2’-Z1’)/(N2-N1)]. 
 
To see how the model works, suppose Zone1 is SE Wales and Zone 2 SW 
Wales, that the (average) distance between them is 40 miles and that the time 
and money costs of traveling that distance to visit the WMC is £10. Table 1 
gives the fall in the proportion of the population visiting as a result of this 
higher cost, from 0.339 to 0.101. This implies that, if the population of SE 
Wales were obliged to pay the costs paid by SW Wales, the numbers visiting 
from SE Wales would fall by 0.238 of the population of SE Wales, or by about 
two thirds. To simplify the annual visitor figures for illustrative purposes, 
suppose that the total each year is 600,000 and 400,000 are from Zone 1 (SE 
Wales). Only one third (0.101/0.339) of SE Wales’ 400,000 would visit the 
WMC when subjected to the higher travel costs, but the remaining 200,000 
from elsewhere would continue visiting. So the reduction in visitors would be 
about 266,000. Then at the same rate of fall-off (each 1p rise in costs loses 
WMC 266 visitors), another £12.5 (3340/266) rise in travel costs would be 
sufficient to eliminate the remaining 334,000.  
 
In terms of figure A2 the vertical distance, Z1’D’, is £22.5 and the horizontal 
distance, Z1’N1, is 600,000. The consumers’ surplus of visitors to WMC, the 
triangle D’Z1’Z1’’, is then 0.5 x £22.5x 600,000 = £6.75 million. Simply for the 
benefit of current visitors, at their pre-visit valuations, it would be socially 
worthwhile subsidizing the WMC by up to this figure (say £11 per visit), if it 
was necessary to keep the Centre open. 
 
The size of the consumers’ surplus depends critically upon the estimated 
costs of the average visitor from SW Wales. The figure of £10 has been 
chosen as a conservative (downward-biased) estimate. Double these costs 
and the consumers’ surplus doubles. 
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Appendix B : British Cities, Prosperity and Culture 
 
Table B1 
 
Urban area 
Total 
resid. 
popn. 
Total 
annual 
popn. 
change 
over 5 
years 
Number 
of 
theatres 
Number of 
museums 
Number 
of public 
libraries 
Total 
book 
and 
other 
media 
loans 
per 
resident 
Average 
price per m2 
for a house 
(euros) 
Proportion of 
employment in 
financial 
intermediation and 
business activities 
Aberdeen 212125 
-
0.5768 3 5 17 7.67 1408.15 18.24
Belfast 277391 
-
0.7832 4 7 29 6.31 1360.98 18.72
Birmingham 977087 
-
0.4266 8 7 44 5.14 1318.43 19.61
Bradford 467657 
-
0.0488 3 13 34 5.43 1041.59 14.78
Bristol 380616 
-
0.1613 8 9 27 5.89 1532.85 26.01
Cambridge 108856 0.158 6 8   2536.23 23.36
Cardiff 305353 0.2344 3 (?3) 22 7.06 1489.10 19.41
Derry 105066 0.2812 2 3 7 3.51 950.98 10.18
Edinburgh 448624 0.1664 10 31 30 7.75 2014.39 29.33
Exeter 111080 0.8457 2 5   1553.38 16.13
Glasgow 577869 
-
0.7104 11 19 36 5.99 1321.40 21.59
Gravesham 95739 0.5174  0   1937.48 11.55
Leeds 715399 0.028 7 11 64 5.97 1335.93 21.77
Leicester 279915 
-
0.6024 2 9 23 6.15 1084.36 13.50
Lincoln 85579 0.2778 2 5   1015.82 11.56
Liverpool 439476 
-
0.8353 7 13 25 7.07 992.20 17.82
Manchester 418600 0.5933 10 11 27 6.21 1306.95 25.33
Newcastle 
upon Tyne 259531 
-
1.1871 7 10 23 7.54 1188.78 19.69
Portsmouth 186699 
-
0.1388 1 7 9 7.42 1570.66 15.31
Sheffield 513231 
-
0.1578 7 8 33 5.74 1136.05 15.60
Stevenage 79734 0.8844 1 1   1762.39 21.23
Worcester 93372 0.649 1 6   1549.44 13.15
Wrexham 128464 0.3881 1  14 5.37 1179.20 8.48
Average  315977 -0.03 4.82 8.95 27.29 6.25 1416.81 17.93
 
Source: Urban Audit Project 
 
 
 
The outlier in the above bivariate association of  figure B1 is Cambridge.  
The association improves substantially from 32 percent explained variance in 
rents to 47 percent explained when the financial and business proportion of 
the city workforce is included in the regression model (Table B2). The 
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coefficient on theatres per 100,000 population in the multiple regression below 
implies that a city with one more theatre per 100,000 has higher rents of 139 
euros per square metre for a house, (about 10 percent of the mean), 
controlling for the consequences of finance and business service employment 
on rents. The theatres coefficient is significant at the 3.9 percent level, while 
the coefficient on finance is significantly different from zero at the 3.4 percent 
level. 
 
 
Figure B1 
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Table B2 
OLS Regression     
Dependent variable Rent    
R Square 0.47   
Adjusted R Square 0.42   
Observations 22   
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 634.317 219.721 2.89 0.009 
theatres per 100,000 139.420 62.794 2.22 0.039 
Finance 28.967 12.703 2.28 0.034 
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